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Abstract
We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding oers of
strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead
to eÆcient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The charac-
terizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public
good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons
games, among others.
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1 Introduction
Game theory and mechanism design are powerful tools that have become essential in
the modeling of economic interactions. Generally, in modeling interactions from public
goods contributions to imperfect competition among rms, the game being played or
mechanism being designed is viewed in isolation. That is, we usually treat the game
as being xed from the players' perspective. The analysis of many games viewed in
such isolation leads to a prediction of an ineÆcient outcome, since in many contexts
there are externalities present. For instance voluntary public goods contributions games
and commons games have well-known free rider problems and equilibria that are Pareto
ineÆcient. Similar results hold for many other games, such as those with imperfect
competition or production externalities such as pollution.
In practice, however, we often see players side contracting to improve eÆciency. For
instance, large donors often match donations of other donors in contributions games. We
see this in public radio and television station fundraising where one donor will agree to
donate an amount equal to that donated by in some time period (sometimes even subject
to minimum or maximum donations or subject to the donations clearing some hurdle).
In fact this is now generally a standard practice. For example, many employers now
oer to match their employees' contributions to any charities. On an intuitive level this
type of side contracting can help overcome externalities and reduce ineÆciencies. The
promise to match donations increases the impact that a donation has and can essentially
compensate for the externality | representing the value that the donation would have to
others. Similar side contracting appears in the tragedy of the commons games in the form
international shing and international pollution agreements, where often some promises
of side payments are included. Again, the side payments can help promote eÆciency by
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changing the incentives so that each party more fully sees the total impact or value that
its actions generate.
While one can see an intuitive role for such side contracting, it is important to fully
understand how such side contracting aects the outcome of the game. Which side
contracts will agents write, and will the ability of agents to side contract lead to eÆciency?
These are the central questions that we address in this paper. There is a widespread
belief among economists in the eÆciency properties of what may be called \Coasian
Contracting." The simple but powerful idea put forth by Coase (1960) says that if
property rights are well-dened, and bargaining is costless, then rational agents faced
with externalities should contract to come to an eÆcient outcome. Roughly speaking,
with fully symmetric information and no transactions costs, agents should be able to
come to an agreement that supports an eÆcient strategy prole as a equilibrium point of
the game with side payments. In this paper we hold this reasoning to a careful scrutiny,
and nd that the issue is surprisingly subtle. Side contracting does not always lead to
eÆciency even when there are no transactions costs, complete information, and binding
contracts. In fact, even if we start with a game that has Pareto eÆcient Nash equilibria,
side contracting on the part of players can change the equilibrium structure so that all
equilibria are ineÆcient!
The perspective we take here is to view a game as being embedded in a larger game
where in a rst stage players may engage in side contracting that can eectively rewrite
payo functions and then play the eventual altered game in the second period. This
takes the eventual game that is played to be endogenous. In particular, we examine the
following scenario: A set of agents are to play a game. The payos of the game are known
to all players (i.e., common knowledge). Before playing the game, the agents can make
enforceable oers of strategy contingent side payments to each other. So, players can
make oers of the sort, \If actions x are played in the game we are about to play, I will
pay you an amount y." The oers that can be made can be contingent on the actions
of more than one player and can oer dierent payments for dierent combinations of
actions. The oers are publicly observed and legally enforceable, and actions taken in
any subsequent play of the game are also observable to any third party such as a court.
If any such oers are made, then the net payos in the game to be played are modied
and this aects the equilibrium behavior. From this point of view, the game has become
endogenous. We explore how the ability to make such enforceable strategy contingent
oers aects the equilibrium payos of the game.
Our main results are a complete characterization of the set of supportable equilibrium
payos in endogenous games. We show that the equilibrium outcomes of a game with
this costless stage of pre-play contracting need not be eÆcient. We cannot completely
rely on endogenous side contracting to solve the ineÆciency problem (and moreover,
side contracting may introduce ineÆciency where it was not a problem before). Our
results provide a complete characterization of the supportable equilibrium outcomes,
and how these depend on the structure of the game. Thus, we identify the class of
games for which such endogenous side contracting will be eÆcient. This class includes
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some interesting examples such as some specications of the tragedy of the commons and
Bertrand games, but also excludes many interesting examples like voluntary contribution
public good games and Cournot games.
The intuition behind the results, and the reason that eÆciency is not always obtained,
is that players wish to use side contracting to modify the game to their own advantage
and not necessarily to the socially optimal outcome. Players realize that their promised
payments to other players inuence the strategic properties of the game, and they each
try to set side contracts to optimally manipulate the overall play of the game. In some
limited contexts, it turns out that players' incentives to manipulate the play in the game
when aggregated across players actually coincides with the social optimum. But in many
other cases the private side contracting incentives and the social welfare will remain at
odds. Moreover, we show that there are some interesting strategic dierences in how
such side contracting aects games with two players versus games with more than two
players.
In the remainder of the introduction we discuss the contribution of this work to the
literature. In Section 2 we discuss an the public goods contribution game at length to
illustrate some of the points of the paper and to show why the simple Coasian intuition
might fail. In Section 3 we present the formal model. Results for the two player case
appear in Section 4, and then in Section 5 we present some applications of the results.
In Section 6 we present the analysis for three or more players. Finally our concluding
remarks appear in Section 7.
Contributions to the Literature
As is clear from the discussion above, this paper is related to what has become known
as the Coase theorem. Coase (1960) was not explicit about the type of agreements
between agents that are necessary as a form of bargaining to reach eÆciency. The types
of contracts that we explore here are fairly rich in that they may be contingent on any
subsequent actions, and certainly allow players to write contracts that would lead to
eÆciency. It is simply not in their strategic interests to do so. Moreover, as we shall
discuss below, the analysis is fairly robust to the timing of side contracting.
While our results might be viewed are somewhat negative, there are various interpre-
tations that one might have. A cautious interpretation of our results is that we show that
the way in which side contracts are proposed (and accepted) is critical to determining
whether or not eÆciency will be reached, even with full information and the absence of
any friction. The issue is more subtle than one might imagine, and if eÆciency is to be
supported it will necessarily require some fairly complicated side contracting. We return
to discuss this in more detail in the concluding remarks, as after we have presented the
results we can be more specic about how the structure of contracting matters.
Another important point to keep in mind is that when our results imply that such
side contracting fails to result in eÆcient outcomes, we do not have to think of this
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as a refutation of eÆciency per se. Rather, it suggests that we should then see the
emergence of other institutional or exogenous solutions. That is, when the necessary
conditions for supporting eÆciency fail, mechanism design has a signicant descriptive
as well as prescriptive role in economics. We should expect to see institutions emerge
such as: restrictions on the class of admissible side contracts, the use of bonding agents,
and mutually binding third party adjudication precisely for this class of situations. On
the other hand, when side contracting implies eÆciency, then mechanism design becomes
secondary | the players can make binding contracts to hit upon the eÆcient outcome
themselves.
Our analysis also relates to some other work in contracting theory. In particular, the
reason ineÆciency arises in our setting is dierent from that in the rest of the literature.
As mentioned above, when ineÆciency arises in the setting we consider, it comes from
the fact that each agent is attempting to oer transfers that manipulate other agents'
behavior to his or her advantage, and not necessarily to what is socially desirable. Agents
eectively compete for payos and this can lead to behavior that is ultimately ineÆcient.
We emphasize that this is a dierent contracting failure from the ones that have been
the primary focus of the recent contracting literature.
1
Here, there is no asymmetry
of information, no cost to contracting, no unforeseen contingencies or complexity to
contracting, and contracts are fully binding and enforced. The failure to reach eÆciency
arises from the combined incentives of each party to manipulate the behavior of the
others through the contracts. Thus, the work here points out that one cannot abstract
away from the process by which contracts are chosen, as that process itself can aect
whether eÆciency is obtained.
A virtue of our approach is that much of the existing contracting literature can be
embedded in our framework as special cases with added restrictions on the admissible
contracts. Here we allow for a very general class of side payments, especially in terms of
the contingencies possible. In particular, a side payment rule is function from the space of
joint strategies to nonnegative numbers. This is a richer payment class than is admitted
in much of the contracting literature. Thus, our results provide a robustness check on
these papers, and perhaps a rationale for the emergence of contracting restrictions. For
example the common agency literature is a special case of our model where only the
players labeled \principal" are allowed to make oers, and the admissible transfers can
only depend on the actions of the agents. Those limitations, can result in dierent
predictions (e.g., see Prat and Rustichini (1999)).
2
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Much of the recent contracting literature has focused on imperfections related to costs of contracting,
asymmetric information, limited enforcement of contracts, and non-veriability of actions or information.
For a recent overview of this extensive literature, see MacLeod (2001). Anderlini and Felli (2001) provide
a nice discussion of the relationship of that literature to failures of the Coase theorem.
2
Another application is the contracting externalities literature. For example in Aghion and Bolton
(1987) there are three players, the incumbent seller, a customer and an entrant. They show that the
customer and incumbent may contract to an ineÆcient outcome that deters entry. In their framework
the entrant is not allowed to make pre-game oers to the incumbent or the customer. Segal (1999)
shows how many contracting papers can be unied by the concept of a contracting externality. Again
our results provide insight into the role played by the restrictions on the class of contracts used in these
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Our results can also be viewed as providing an important warning to the vast liter-
ature on mechanism design and implementation. With very few exceptions, the game
theory, mechanism design, and implementation literatures analyze games or mechanisms
when they are taken as xed by the players. The strategies of the game or mechanism
are assumed to completely capture those available and the payos capture all of those
relevant. Hurwicz (1994) oers compelling arguments for viewing mechanisms in a larger
natural context. He discusses a variety of factors, ranging from enforceability of the out-
comes, to natural actions that are available to agents outside of those of the mechanism.
Hurwicz argues that such factors may ultimately play important roles in determining the
outcome of the mechanism, and so these must be taken into account in designing mech-
anisms, and even more basically the eects of such factors must be understood when
making predictions concerning the performance of any given mechanism. One can view
our analysis from this perspective, taking the ability of agents to commit to transfers
prior to a game as something that is natural and unavoidable in many contexts. Our
ndings show that the outcomes of the game can be greatly aected by thinking of games
and mechanisms in a larger context, which lends support to Hurwicz's point. Most im-
portantly, the implications can go in dierent directions. As mentioned above and shown
below, in some instances the broader endogenous view of games leads to improvements
in eÆciency and other times it actually worsens the outcomes. This emphasizes how
important it is to understand the broader context in which a game or mechanism resides,
and suggests this as an important area for further study.
Of course, with respect to the game theoretic literature, there is an easy way to
view our work. We characterize the outcomes of games when strategy contingent side
payments are allowed to be promised by players.
One exception to viewing a game as xed is delegation games (e.g., see Fershtman,
Judd, and Kalai (1991) and a recent application in Miller and Pazgal (2001)).
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In dele-
gation games players may hire another player to play the game for them. This eectively
allows a player to change their own incentives and thus can change the outcomes of a
game. There are important dierences between the delegation setting and the side con-
tracting setting we consider. Most importantly in delegation games a player can only
change their own payo structure, and cannot make promised payments to other players
to induce other players to change their strategies. Also, in our setting players' own payos
can only be changed via transfers to or from another player, rather than to a delegate.
Thus there is also a dierence in the way payos in the game must be balanced. These
dierences prove critical and lead to completely dierent results. Nevertheless, while the
delegation setting is quite dierent from what we analyze here, there are similarities in
the underlying motivation and both can be viewed as forms of endogenous games.
papers. A further example and illustration of some of these points can be found in the public goods
literature discussed at length below.
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A few other exceptions are the analysis of choices of mechanisms by competing sellers (e.g., see
McAfee (1993)), choice of voting rules (e.g., see Barbera and Jackson (2000)), exibility on the part
of the planner (e.g., Baliga and Sjostrom (1995), and mechanism selection more generally (e.g., see
Laguno (1992) and Allen (2001)). For recent introductions to the implementation and mechanism
design literatures, and some additional discussion of endogenous mechanisms, see Jackson (2000, 2001).
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Another exception to viewing the game as xed is found in Kalai and Samet (1985)
who looked at players trying to come to a unanimous and binding agreement as to a
social state that is to be chosen.
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They nd that given enough rounds in the unanimous
voting process a Pareto eÆcient agreement about the social state will be reached. The
social states can include a specication of how a second-stage game will be played, and
so our work is related to the Kalai and Samet analysis. However, their analysis focuses
on the unanimity voting process over social states and then assumes the social state to
be binding | so if one takes the social state to be play of a game, then it is implicit
that players can commit to how they will play the second-stage game. In our analysis
players only commit to contingent transfer functions, and then the play in the second-
stage game must be an equilibrium given the transfer functions. So we analyze what
transfers might be made to support play in the second-stage game, and see when it is in
the interest of players to make the transfers that actually support eÆciency as opposed
to making transfers to otherwise manipulate the game.
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In the Kalai and Samet analysis
players come to agree on an eÆcient outcome, while we will nd that explicit modeling
of transfers among players will change the analysis and sometimes lead to ineÆciency, at
least for two players, while the results will be more congruent for three or more players.
Finally, our analysis is closely related to the study of matching games that have
been analyzed by Guttman (1978, 1987), Danziger and Schnytzer (1991), Guttman and
Schnytzer (1992), and Varian (1994a), among others. They show that eÆciency can be
obtained when agents can undertake matching plans in the context of public goods and
some other settings with externalities. Our results will in many contexts be at odds with
the results from those papers. The reason behind the dierence in results is that those
papers limit the set of contracts that are available to agents so that they can only make
some types of promised payments. As we will point out, if agents can choose from a
richer set of contracts (and they have a strict incentive to, as we shall see) then eÆciency
no longer holds. This is illustrated in the next section and provides a starting point for
our analysis.
2 An Example: Public Goods and Matching Contri-
butions
The intuitive argument for how side contracting might support eÆcient outcomes, and
the reasoning of Coase, is roughly as follows. One agent can oer a second agent compen-
sation as a function of the second agent's action that eectively reects any externality
4
See also Kalai (1981), as well as later work by Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1996) who consider a single
player who suggests contracts on how to play a game.
5
One could also allow Kalai and Samet's social states to include specications of transfer functions
and how the game will be played. However, their eÆciency result only holds for nite sets of social
states, and so the richness of transfer functions that is critical in our analysis could not be admitted
in their setting. Indeed, we will reach a dierent conclusion regarding eÆciency which hinges on this
richness.
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that the second agent's action has on the rst agent. Essentially, it is as if the rst agent
says to the second agent \the benet to me is x if you take action A rather than action
B, and the cost to you of taking action A rather than B is only y where x > y, and so I
will pay you z, where x  z  y, if you play A instead of B." Any z such that x  z  y
will provide suÆcient incentives.
The more subtle issue arises when this is put into a richer setting, where more than
one agent is taking an action at the same time. Then strategic factors come into play
that make the analysis signicantly more complicated.
To make things concrete, let us consider an example which has been well-studied in the
literature. The example is of a voluntary provision of a public good. Individuals may each
make a contribution to cover the cost of the provision of a public good, and the amount
of the good provided is determined by the total of the donations. As is well-known,
in such contribution games a free rider problem exists and equilibrium behavior results
in ineÆciently low contributions.
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When deciding on a contribution, each individual
considers the marginal impact that his or her contribution makes to his or her own well-
being, but not to the social impact it has on others who are also consuming the public
good. However, such a game should not be viewed in isolation. If the economic agents
understand the incentives and ineÆciency of the outcome of voluntary contributions
game, they can work beforehand to correct it. In a Coasian manner, they can side
contract to reward each other for making contributions, and try to correct each other's
incentives. For instance, an individual can announce that they will \match" (at some
rate) the contributions that are made in the game.
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For example, consider a society of two individuals and a public good produced through
a linear cost technology. For simplicity, consider a case where each individual can either
contribute a unit of the public good or not. The utility of one unit of the public good is 4
to each agent. The marginal utility of a second unit of the public good is 3. To contribute
to the public good costs an agent 5 units of utility. So, if only one agent contributes to
the public good then that agent's total utility is 4-5=-1 and the other agent's utility is
4. If both agents contribute then they each earn 4+3-5=2. The payos are represented
as follows.
C N
C 2; 2  1; 4
N 4; 1 0; 0
6
For some recent work that examines the possibility of reaching eÆciency through sequential contribu-
tions, see Fershtman and Nitzan (1991), Admati and Perry (1991) and Marx and Matthews (2000). For
some approaches to (re-)designing games to lead to eÆciency see Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), Jackson
and Moulin (1992), Varian (1994b), Ellis and van den Nouweland (1998), Bag and Winter (1998).
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In this paper we model direct side payments rather than actions such as matching contributions.
Whether a player is partly reimbursed for a contribution, or someone else makes a matching contribution
is irrelevant to the outcome. Moreover, the direct side payments allow for a more general set of contingent
payments that go beyond simple matchings; and such side payments can be made in any game moving
beyond public goods contributions games.
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This has the classic form of a prisoner's dilemma, with a unique equilibrium involving
no contribution of the public good.
Now let us examine the Coasian intuition and what happens if agents can make
binding oers of action contingent side payments before the game is played. Consider
the eÆcient situation where both players are contributing to the public good. The column
player would gain 2 by deviating and not contributing. This deviation would hurt the
row player by 3. So it is in the row player's interest to oer any payment of at least 2
and no more than 3 to the column player contingent on the column player contributing.
The only such payment that makes sense from the row player's perspective is a payment
of 2, since giving any more is simply a gratuitous transfer to the other player. The same
logic works in reverse, so that the column player is willing to make a payment of 2 to the
row player contingent on the row player contributing. Taking these two transfers into
account, the net payos to the two players looks as follows.
C N
C 2; 2 1; 2
N 2; 1 0; 0
This side contracting has changed the game so that the eÆcient contributions are an
equilibrium (and in this example are actually weakly dominant strategies). This insight is
rst due to Guttman (1978), and has been extended to a variety of voluntary contribution
games and other games with externalities by Danziger and Schnytzer (1990), and Varian
(1994), among others.
This, however, is not the end of the story. We can ask whether these particular
side payments are in fact part of equilibrium play. For instance, if the column player
is oering the row player a payment of 2 contingent on the row player contributing, is
it in the row player's interest to oer a payment of 2 contingent on the column player
contributing? The answer is no.
8
Suppose that instead, the row player oers to pay the
column player 1 + " for each unit of contribution to the public good, made by either
player (where " > 0).
9
The resulting game is as follows.
C N
C 2  2"; 2 + 2"  "; 3 + "
N 3  "; " 0; 0
8
The reason that this does not contradict the analyses of Guttman (1978), Danziger and Schnytzer
(1990), and Varian (1994a), is that they only consider a limited form of matching contracts, where
matching or payments can only be made in proportion to the actions taken by the other agents (see also
Qin who considers also payments made only contingent on own action). As we see here, either player
would strictly gain by deviating and using a dierent sort of contract (arguably just as simple). In fact
one observes matching oers of the form \I will match any contributions," rather than just \I will match
the contributions made by other people." Such seemingly minor dierences in contract specication
have important implications for incentives, as illustrated in this example.
9
If " = 0 there are two equilibria to the game, but both are still ineÆcient and involve the row player
not contributing.
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This has a unique equilibrium which is ineÆcient, but better from the row player's
perspective: the column player contributes and the row player does not contribute. Thus,
it will not be an equilibrium for the players to oer the \eÆcient" matching plans as this
example shows. As will follow from the theorems we prove below, the only equilibria to
this two stage process for this example are ineÆcient | (and in fact in this example are
in mixed strategies).
Let us now provide a general framework for analyzing these issues.
3 Denitions
A set N = f1; : : : ; ng of players interact in two stages.
First, let us oer an informal description of the process.
Stage 1: Players simultaneously announce transfer functions. That is, each player
announces a prole of functions indicating the payments that they promise to make to
each other player as a function of the full prole of actions chosen in the second-stage
game.
Stage 2: Players choose actions in the game.
Payos: The payo that player i receives is his or her payo in the game plus all
transfers that other players have promised to i conditional on the actions played in the
game minus the transfers player i promised to make to other players conditional on the
actions played in the game.
The transfer functions that are announced in Stage 1 are binding. There are many
ways in which this could be enforced, ranging from reputation, posting a bond with a
third party, to having legal enforcement of contracts. We do not model these details
here, and simply assume that the announcements are public so that all players know all
of the promises. As will become clear in the analysis that follows, the simultaneity of the
announcements is not critical to the overall theme of the results (that eÆciency is only
reached in limited situations), but is important in determining the relative payos of the
players.
The fact that the transfer promises are unilaterally binding ts well with the matching
contributions in public goods games, reward schemes and a variety of other applications.
10
10
For an alternative framework where unanimity is required to enforce another's oer see Ray and
Vohra (1997) or Qin (2001).
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We also point out that players can eectively refuse a contract by simply announcing
a transfer that undoes the other player's transfer.
11
In fact, in this way they can choose
to undo part of the other player's promise and keep part.
Let us also say a word or two about \consideration." Some contracts that we admit
are of the form where one player makes a promise contingent only on his or her own
action. These contracts are useful ways of posting a bond or committing ones-self to
taking certain actions. Such contracts might not always be legally enforceable because
of the lack of \adequate consideration" by the other player - i.e., the other player did
not do anything. Note however, that these promises are easily approximated by promises
that vary in some way on the other players' actions, or can be supported by other
considerations outside of our model such as reputation, as we have already discussed.
We now provide formal denitions.
The Underlying (Second-Stage) Game
The second-stage game consists of a nite pure strategy space X
i
, with X = 
i
X
i
.
Let (X
i
) denote the set of mixed strategies for player i, and let and  = 
i
(X
i
).
We denote by x
i
, x, 
i
and  generic elements of X
i
, X, (X
i
), and , respectively. In
some cases we use x
i
and x to denote elements in (X
i
) and , respectively, that place
probability one on x
i
and x.
The restriction to nite strategy spaces provides for a simple presentation of the
results, avoiding some technical details. Nevertheless, games with a continuum of actions
are important, and we provide results for the case of games with continuous action spaces
in the appendix. These results are a straightforward extension of the nite case.
Payos in the second-stage game are given by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function v
i
: X ! IR.
The First Stage Transfer Functions
The transfer functions that player i announces in the rst period are given the vector
of functions t
i
= (t
i1
; : : : ; t
in
), where t
ij
: X ! IR
+
represents the promises to player j as
a function of the actions that are played in the second-period game. So, if x is played in
the second period, then i transfers t
ij
(x) to player j.
Let t = (t
1
; : : : ; t
n
). Also, denote by t
0
i
the degenerate transfers such that t
0
ij
(x) = 0
for all x 2 X, and let t
0
= (t
0
1
; : : : ; t
0
n
).
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Note also, that this can be added to a transfer that the second player wants to announce. This is
not possible in the context of mixed strategies, but our focus is on support in pure strategies where this
is possible.
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The Payos
The payo to player i given a prole of transfer functions t and a play x in the
second-period game is then
12
U
i
(x; t) = v
i
(x) +
X
j 6=i
(t
ji
(x)  t
ij
(x)) :
So, given a prole of transfer functions t and a mixed strategy  played in the second-
period game, the expected utility to player i is
EU
i
(; t) =
X
x

i

i
(x
i
)
2
4
v
i
(x) +
X
j 6=i
(t
ji
(x)  t
ij
(x))
3
5
:
Let NE(t) denote the set of (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria of the second-stage
game where payos are given as above. So this is the set of Nash equilibria taking a
prole of transfer functions t as given, and only varying the strategies in the second-
period game.
Supportable Strategies and Payos
A pure strategy prole x 2 X of the second-stage game together with a vector of
payos u 2 IR
n
such that
P
i
u
i
=
P
i
v
i
(x) is supportable if there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the two stage game where some t is played in the rst stage and x
is played in the second stage (on the equilibrium path), and U
i
(x; t) = u
i
.
Supportability is a condition that applies to a combination of a strategy prole and
a set of payos. We refer to both since in some cases transfers must be made on the
equilibrium path to support x as part of an equilibrium. In such cases the payos
including transfers dier from the original underlying payos without transfers.
The denition supportability looks at pure strategies in terms of what is played on
the equilibrium path. In many games (in fact generically), there is a unique x that is
eÆcient. Thus, it makes sense to focus on pure strategy equilibria, at least in terms of the
second period. The focus on pure strategies in terms of t's is for technical convenience,
as the space of mixed strategies over all such transfer functions is a complicated animal
(measures over functions) and considering them would not add much to the results.
13
12
This assumes transferable utility, and it would be interesting to see how this extends to situations
where private goods transfer at dierent rates across players.
13
In many of the examples where eÆciency turns out not to be supportable in pure strategies, allowing
for mixed strategies would not help. We are not sure whether this is always the case. We do know that
it is important to consider mixed strategies o the equilibrium path in the second-period game, and so
we do explicitly account for this.
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Surviving Equilibria
In addition to understanding supportability in the two stage process, we are also
interested in following question. When does an equilibrium of the original underlying
game survive to be supportable when the two stage process is considered?
Consider a pure strategy prole x 2 X of the second-stage game that is an equilibrium
of the second stage when no transfers are possible (x 2 NE(t
0
)). Such an equilibrium
survives if there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the two stage game where some
t is played in the rst stage and x is played in the second stage (on the equilibrium path),
with net payos being U
i
(x; t) = v
i
(x).
Note that x survives if and only if x is a Nash equilibrium of the second-stage game and
(x; v(x)) is supportable in the two stage process. Together, the notions of supportability
and surviving then give us an idea of how the set of equilibrium and equilibrium payos
change when players can make binding transfer commitments.
4 Two Player Games
The results for two player games and games with more than two players dier signicantly
and so we treat them separately. We start with an analysis of two player games.
The following notion plays an important role in the characterization results that
follow.
Solo Transfers
Suppose that only one player were allowed to propose transfers in the rst stage. We
can consider the transfers that would be best from this player's perspective.
Let
14
u
s
i
= sup
t
i
"
min
2NE(t
0
 i
;t
i
)
EU
i
(; t
0
 i
; t
i
)
#
:
So, a player's \solo" payo is the one obtained when the player is allowed to announce
any transfer function that he or she likes and no other player can make any transfers.
As there may be several equilibria in the second-stage game that result from any given
transfer function, we must have some idea of which one will be relevant. This denition
14
Note that the min in this expression are well-dened since the set of Nash equilibria of a nite game
is compact. The sup is necessary as there may be no maximizer. For instance, consider a game where
X
1
= fx
1
g while X
2
= fx
2
; x
0
2
g. Let player 2 be indierent between the actions and player 1 prefer that
2 play x
2
. Any positive transfer from 1 to 2 leads to a unique equilibrium of x
2
, but a 0 transfer leads
to a minimizing equilibrium of x
0
2
.
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imagines the worst continuation equilibrium for i once t is in place. This turns out to be
the correct denition for characterizations that follow.
To get some intuition for the denition above, consider the public goods game from
Section 2:
C N
C 2; 2  1; 4
N 4; 1 0; 0
Here the solo payo for the row player (and similarly the column player) is 3. By making
a payment of 1 + " conditional on the column player playing C, the new matrix becomes
C N
C 1  "; 3 + "  1; 4
N 3  "; " 0; 0
This has a unique equilibrium leading to a payo of 3  " for the row player. Taking the
sup over such payments leads to a payo of 3 for the row player, which is the solo payo.
The usefulness of this concept is illustrated in the theorems below.
Our rst result is a characterization of the Nash equilibria of a game that survive
when transfers are introduced.
Theorem 1 If n = 2, then a Nash equilibrium x of the underlying game survives if and
only if v
i
(x)  u
s
i
for each i. Moreover, if x survives then there is an equilibrium in
the overall process where no transfers are made in the rst stage and x is played in the
second stage.
The formal proof of Theorem 1 uses the proof of Theorem 7 and appears in the
appendix. However, the intuition is fairly simple and we explain it here.
First, let us show that this condition is suÆcient to have x survive. Consider a Nash
equilibrium x such that v
i
(x)  u
s
i
. On the equilibrium path let players make no transfers
in the rst stage (play t
0
) and then play x in the second stage. O the equilibrium path, if
some player oers transfers in the rst period, then identify the worst equilibrium for that
player in the resulting second-stage game and have that be played in the continuation
(and if more than one player oers transfers in the rst period then play any equilibrium
in the second stage). This is easily seen to be a subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall
game: the best payo a player can get by deviating in the rst stage is no more than
their solo payo, which is not improving; and given that no transfers are made in the
rst stage, x will be an equilibrium in the second stage.
Next, consider a Nash equilibrium x that survives. We argue that v
i
(x)  u
s
i
. Let t
be any transfer function that is made in the rst stage as part of an equilibrium where
x is played in the second stage. Suppose to the contrary that v
i
(x) < u
s
i
. The denition
13
of solo payo then implies that some transfer t
i
, so that the payo to i under worst
continuation equilibrium under t
i
; t
0
j
is higher than v
i
(x). So, let i do the following: make
a transfer that cancels out the transfers under t
j
and then adds t
i
on top. That is, let
i announce
b
t
i
= t
i
+ t
j
. Note that the pair of transfers
b
t
i
; t
j
leads to exactly the same
second stage payos as t
i
; t
0
j
. Thus, from the denition of t
i
, it follows that if i deviates
to
b
t
i
while j plays t
j
then even the worst continuation equilibrium in the second stage
will result in a payo which is higher than v
i
(x). This contradicts the fact that t was
part of an equilibrium where x was played in the second stage.
To get an idea of the impact of Theorem 1, we illustrate it in the context of several
examples.
Example 2 Only the EÆcient Equilibrium Survives.
A B
A 2; 2 0; 0
B 0; 0 1; 1
In this pure coordination game, there are two equilibria (A,A) and (B,B). The solo
payos are 2 for each player
15
and so it follows from Theorem 1 that the only equilibrium
that survives once transfers are allowed is (A,A).
Example 3 The EÆcient Equilibrium Does Not Survive.
Consider the following game, which has an eÆcient equilibrium of U,L leading to
payos of 2,2. It is easily checked that the solo payos are 3 to each player.
L C R
U 2; 2 0; 0 0; 0
M 0; 0 3; 0 0; 0
D 0; 0 0; 0 0; 3
So, in this game the eÆcient equilibrium does not survive. In fact, no equilibrium sur-
vives, and the only equilibria of the two stage process involve mixing over transfer func-
tions announced in the rst stage.
Next, we provide an example which shows why it was necessary to consider mixed
strategies in the denition of solo payos.
Example 4 Mixed Strategies in the solo Denition
15
For instance, if the row player makes the transfer of 2 to the column player conditional on (B,A)
being played, then the unique equilibrium becomes (A,A).
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Consider the following game.
L C R
U 1; 10 0; 0 0; 0
M 0; 0 3; 0 0; 10
D 0; 0 0; 10 3; 0
Let us see if the strategies x = (U; L) with payos u = (1; 10) are supportable. (Here the
minimal transfer function is t
0
.) The highest payo in the matrix for the column player
is 10, and so this should be ne. So, we need only consider what the row player can
expect. If we use the straight pure strategy solo denition, then the best payo that the
row player can induce is 1. This would suggest that U,L would in fact be supportable
without any transfers. However, if we consider mixed strategies things change. Suppose
that the row player pays the column player 2 conditional on U being played. That leads
to the following matrix.
L C R
U  1; 11  1; 1  1; 1
M 0; 0 3; 0 0; 10
D 0; 0 0; 10 3; 0
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium which is a mixed strategy equilibrium (equal
mixing on M and D by row, and C and R by column) leading to a payo of 1.5 to the
row player. This means that the threat point for the row player is indeed 1.5. That is
what is captured in the denition of solo payos.
As one can also verify that the modied solo payo of the column player is 10, and
so Theorem 7 below will actually show that no action-payo pair is supportable in this
example. What that means is that any equilibrium in the two stage process will involve
mixing over the transfers functions announced in the rst stage.
16
Note that the reasoning behind Theorem 1 did not rely on the fact that x was a Nash
equilibrium of the second-stage game to begin with. So, in fact we have just argued
a necessary condition for supportability as well as survivorship. This is stated in the
following Theorem:
Theorem 5 If n = 2, then (x; u) is supportable only if u  u
s
i
for each i.
While there are instances where u  u
s
i
for each i is enough to ensure that (x; u)
is supportable, there are other games where it is not. The full necessary and suÆcient
condition for supportability is dened below.
Before stating the full characterization, we note that Theorem 5 can still be quite
useful. This follows since u  u
s
i
is already a very demanding condition that fails in
16
Since the total of the modied solo payos is 11.5, any pure strategies of transfers in the rst stage
must lead to an equilibrium in the second stage that is below the modied solo payo of one of the two
players who could then benet by deviating.
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many games. Thus, supportability can be ruled out in many cases simply by checking
whether u  u
s
i
.
That is true of the public goods contribution example in Section 2, as there the solo
payo of each player is 3, and there is no pair of actions possible that could lead to a
payo of at least 3 to each player at the same time.
Now let us turn to obtaining the full characterization of supportability.
Consider supporting (x; u). It is important to allow u 6= v(x), as x may not naturally
be a Nash equilibrium to begin with and so some side payments may be necessary to
support an action prole as an equilibrium. Thus, in order to characterize supportability
it will be important to have some idea of what transfers are (minimally) necessary.
In fact, it is easy to dene the minimum necessary set of transfers to support a given
action prole as an equilibrium. First, if u
i
6= v
i
(x) for some i, then it must be that some
transfer is being made. In particular, if v
i
(x) > u
i
the it must be that i is transferring
at least v
i
(x)   u
i
to j. Similarly, if v
i
(x) < u
i
the it must be that j is transferring at
least u
i
  v
i
(x) to i. Also, to preclude other deviations if v
i
(x
j
;
b
x
i
) > u
i
, then it must
be that if x; u is supported then i must be making a transfer t
ij
(x
j
;
b
x
i
)  v
i
(x
j
;
b
x
i
)  u
i
,
otherwise x would not be an equilibrium in the second stage of the process. Collecting
these ideas leads to the following denition.
Minimal Transfers
The minimum transfer function prole t
x;u
for a pair x; u is dened by:
t
x;u
ij
(
b
x) =

max[v
i
(
b
x)  u
i
; 0] if
b
x
j
= x
j
0 otherwise.
The idea of a minimum transfer function is illustrated in the following example.
Example 6 Minimal Transfer Function
Consider the following game.
L R
U 4; 4 0; 6
D 5; 0 0; 6
Let us consider supporting the actions (U,L) as part of an equilibrium. No matter
what transfers are promised, the column player can always get at least a payo of 6
by not announcing any transfers in the rst stage and then playing R in the second
stage. So in order to support the eÆcient combination of (U,L) as part of an equilibrium,
16
it must be that a transfer of at least 2 is made from the row player to the column
player conditional on U,L being played. This gives us one part of the minimal transfer
function. So, now consider supporting x =(U,L) with payos u = (2; 6). In order to have
(U,L) be an equilibrium with these payos, it would also have to be that the row player
transfers at least 3 to the column player conditional on (D,L), as otherwise (U,L) could
not be an equilibrium (given the transfer of 2 from the row player to the column player
conditional on (U,L)). So, these transfers are the minimal transfers to support x =(U,L)
and u = (2; 6).
To see why these must be accounted for in the denition of solo payo in order to get
a full characterization, modify the payo of (D,L) to be (5,4). In that case, the minimal
transfers lead to a new payo of (D,L) of (2,7). That makes the column player's modied
solo payo 7 (as dened below) while the column player's solo payo was only 6. This
higher payo is the relevant one for strategic considerations in the two stage game where
one tries to support (U,L) as an equilibrium.
Given the denition of minimum transfers above, we can now dene the solo payos
noting that these minimal transfers (or some larger transfers) would have to be in place
in order to lead to x; u as part of an equilibrium outcome in the two stage process.
Modied solo Payos
u
ms
i
(x; u) = sup
t
i
2
4
min
2NE(t
x;u
 i
;t
i
)
EU
i
(; t
x;u
 i
; t
i
)
3
5
:
The above denition of modied solo payos leads to the following complete charac-
terization of supportable action-payo pairs.
Theorem 7 If n = 2, then (x; u) is supportable if and only if u
i
 u
ms
i
(x; u) for each
i. Moreover, if (x; u) is supportable it is supportable with the minimal transfer function
prole t
x;u
.
5 Applications
To see the implications of the results above, let us examine some common settings.
17
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The applications we consider are standard ones, and as such generally have some feature of strategic
substitutes or complements. However, as seen from the characterization theorem, the conditions for
supportability are not related to conditions of strategic complementarity (or sub- or super- modularity),
but instead depend on the modied solo payos. This can be seen by looking across examples, or even
simply at the prisoners' dilemma example.
17
One Sided Externalities
Consider a classic one sided externality, such as Coase's example of a steel mill af-
fecting a laundry. Let x
1
denote the output of the steel mill and x
2
denote the output
of the laundry. The utility functions are given by v
1
(x
1
) and v
2
(x
1
; x
2
). Let there be a
unique Nash equilibrium x
n
1
; x
n
2
, and a unique eÆcient point x

1
; x

2
.
Let us consider supporting the eÆcient solution. Player 2's minimal transfer function
is t
21
(x) = v
1
(x

1
)   v
1
(x
n
1
) if x
1
= x

1
and t
21
(x) = 0 otherwise.
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Let u be the induced
utility levels under eÆciency with t
21
as specied above, and t
0
12
.
Player 1 gets u
1
= v
1
(x
n
1
) under any Nash equilibrium with t
21
; t
0
12
. By oering any
other t
12
, player 1 will make additional payments without gaining any additional utility.
Thus, u
ms
1
(x

; u) = u
1
. Given t
0
12
, u
ms
2
(x

; u) is the same as player 2's solo payo u
s
2
.
That payo is the solution to
max
x
1
;x
2
;t
1
v
2
(x
1
; x
2
)  t
1
subject to
v
1
(x
1
) + t
1
 v
1
(x
n
1
):
It is clear that a solution must involve setting t
1
= v
1
(x
n
1
)  v
1
(x
1
) and so we can rewrite
the problem as
max
x
1
;x
2
v
2
(x
1
; x
2
) + v
1
(x
1
)  v
1
(x
n
1
):
The solution to this is the eÆcient production x

, and involves making the payment
t
21
(x

) = v
1
(x
n
1
)   v
1
(x

1
). Thus, by Theorem 7, the eÆcient point is sustainable as a
contracting equilibrium. Coase's intuition that the polluter and victim can reach an
eÆcient outcome is indeed correct with these side contracts for a one sided externality.
Bertrand Competition
Consider the case of two rms competing in a Bertrand market. Let each rm have
a linear cost function c(q
i
) = cq
i
as a function of their production quantity q
i
, and the
demand function be described by Q(p) where Q =
P
q
i
and p is the lowest price oered
by any rm. Here the strategic variable of each rm is price p
i
2 IR
+
. Follow the
textbook Bertrand rule that rms charging the lowest price split the market evenly and
that rms with higher prices sell zero. The Nash Equilibrium payo for each rm in the
underlying Bertrand game is zero. Let 
m
denote the industry payo if all rms charge
the monopoly price. Can we support the strategy p
i
= p
m
and payos u
i
=

m
2
for all
i 2 N?
Consider supporting these with the corresponding minimal transfer functions t, which
in this case amount to paying

m
2
to the other rm if the other rm j charges the monopoly
18
This transfer function is discontinuous, but one can also work with t
21
(x) = v
1
(x
1
)  v
1
(x
n
1
), which
is continuous. For details on the treatment of continuum actions, see the appendix.
18
price and rm i does not and 0 otherwise.
19
Note that a rm can get arbitrarily close to
the full monopoly price by slightly lowering price, which would increase their prots by

m
2
. So these must be the minimal supporting transfer functions. Let us then consider
the modied solo payo to rm 1, u
ms
1
. This modied solo payo is exactly

m
2
. It is
straightforward to check that the best player 1 can hope to get is for the players to both
charge the monopoly price and split the market | which requires paying player 2 half
of the prot to keep him from lowering his price slightly and getting arbitrarily close to
the full prot. Thus the payment to player 2 cancels that from 2 to 1. Therefore, by
Theorem 7 the eÆcient (collusive) outcome is supportable.
Public Goods
Consider the two person example of voluntary contributions to a public good. Let
x
i
2 IR
+
be player i
0
s contribution and her utility be v
i
(x
1
; x
2
) = 2
i
(
P
x
j
)
1
2
  x
i
where
P

j
= 1 and 
j
> 0 for j = 1; 2. Suppose that 
1
> 
2
. This ensures a unique
Nash equilibrium in the contribution game, x
n
1
= 
2
1
; x
n
2
= 0. The associated utilities
are v
1
(x
n
1
; x
n
2
) = 
2
1
, v
2
(x
n
1
; x
n
2
) = 2
2

1
. The eÆcient allocation is any pair such that
P
x
i
= 1. Moreover the net utilities at any eÆcient allocation sum to 1, that is if the
pair (x
0
; u) is eÆcient and sustainable then
P
u
i
= 1.
Now consider 1's solo payo u
s
1
. Let t
12
(x
2
) = 
1
x
2
. If this oer is made then in the
subgame perfect equilibrium that follows x
2
= 1. Thus, u
s
1
 2
1
  
1
= 
1
.
Now consider 2's solo payo u
s
2
. Player 2, knowing that absent any oer she can free
ride on 1's Nash contribution, can use the minimal transfer to force player 1 to provide
the eÆcient level of contribution. In particular set t
21
(x) = 
2
1
  (2
1
  1) if x
1
= 1 and
t
21
(x) = 0 otherwise.
20
If this oer is made then in the subgame perfect equilibrium
x
1
= 1. Thus, u
s
2
= 2
2
  [
2
1
  (2
1
  1)] = 1  
2
1
.
Putting these together we nd that
P
u
s
i
 
1
+(1  
2
1
) > 1. Thus as at any eÆcient
outcome
P
u
i
(x
0
; t
0
) = 1 it follows from Theorem 5 no eÆcient outcome is supportable.
Indeed, there is no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game.
Agency Models
Another application of our results is to the agency problem. A simple principal-agent
setting may be viewed as a game with one sided externalities, where only the agent
takes actions in the second-stage game, and so the principal only worries about making
transfers to the agent to induce eÆcient actions. Since this is a one sided externality
problem, then as noted above eÆcient outcomes can be supported.
21
19
These are more than the minimal transfer functions in some cases where i undercuts at a price that
leads to less than monopoly prots, but these transfers are simple and suÆce in this problem.
20
This can be substituted for by a carefully constructed continuous function and still give exactly the
same incentives.
21
Of course, this rst-best conclusion is due to the absence of any asymmetry of information and hence
moral hazard.
19
A more interesting case is that of common agency (e.g., see Bernheim and Whinston
(1986), Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1986)), where there may be multiple principals
competing to inuence the behavior of an agent, or even multiple agents.
22
The common
agency case falls under the three or more player case that is analyzed in the next section.
Cournot Duopoly
Consider a classic Cournot duopoly where the action x
i
2 IR
+
is quantity choice
of rm i, inverse demand is linear (a  
P
i
x
i
) and costs are zero. The payo function
to rm i is v
i
(x
1
; x
2
) = (a  
P
x
i
)x
i
. In this case, the symmetric Cournot equilibrium
quantities are x
n
i
= a=3, and the resulting payos are v
i
(x
n
) = a
2
=9. If the rms were to
collude eÆciently,
23
they would choose the monopoly output, x
1
+ x
2
= a=2 and share
the monopoly prots. Thus
P
u
i
= a
2
=4.
Let us check that no such pair of strategies and split of monopoly prots is support-
able. Consider player 1's solo payo, u
s
1
. If Player 1 chooses output x
0
1
she can ensure
that 2 does not enter the market by the paying contingent on x
1
, the minimal transfer
as dened above, t
12
(x
0
1
; 0) = (a   x
1
)
2
=4. In addition 1 can credibly commit to play
any such action x
0
1
in a subgame perfect equilibrium by oering to pay t
12
(x
1
) = a
2
if
x
1
6= x
0
1
. To calculate a lower bound on player 1's solo payo u
s
1
we solve:
max V = (a  x
1
)x
1
  (a  x
1
)
2
=4:
The solution is x
1
=
3a
5
and so u
s
1

a
2
5
. However the symmetric argument applies to
player 2 and so
P
u
s
i
=
2a
2
5
> a
2
=4. Thus, by Theorem 5 the eÆcient outcome is not
supportable. Notice that this is in contrast to the case of Bertrand competition.
Prisoners Dilemma
We remark that the supportability of the eÆcient outcome depends on the specics
of the payos, and that very simple variations in a game can change its properties. For
instance, for the version of the public goods contribution game (prisoners' dilemma)
below, the eÆcient actions were not supportable as we saw in Section 2.
C N
C 2; 2  1; 4
N 4; 1 0; 0
22
Prat and Rustichini (1999) study situations with several principals and several agents, where princi-
pals may make strategy contingent payments to the agents who then play a game; and where agents only
care about the transfers. Principals may always be seen as players with degenerate strategy spaces in the
second-period game. That analysis does not quite t into our setting, as the agents are not allowed to
make payments to each other and there are other restrictions on side payments. We discuss this below.
23
EÆciency in this context is somewhat perverse, as we are focusing only on the incentives of the rms
and ignoring the welfare of the consumers. So, the lack of supporting collusion is actually good from
society's perspective.
20
However, the following modication, which has the same strategic properties (it is
strictly dominant for each player to play N, while both playing C is eÆcient) has dierent
supportability properties. Here, it is straightforward to see that the (modied) solo
payos are 3 for each player, and so C,C is supportable.
C N
C 3; 3 0; 4
N 4; 0 1; 1
Notice that this points out that supportability depends on the cardinal structure of
the game, and not simply the strategic structure.
Commons Problems
Commons problems have results that are similar to those of public goods, with in-
eÆciency being pervasive. There the solo payos come from paying the other player(s)
to have low usage levels of the common resource, but still to have a high level of usage
one's self. Generally, the sum of the solo levels exceeds the eÆcient point and eÆcient
outcomes are not supportable.
6 Three or More Players
In the case of three or more players, it is relatively easier to support outcomes in the two
stage process. That is captured in the following theorems, the rst of which addresses
the issue of survivability.
Theorem 8 If n  3, then every Nash equilibrium of the underlying game survives.
The reason for the much more positive outcomes with three or more players, and
for instance the contrast between Theorems 1 and 8, is with more than two players it is
possible for players to eectively commit themselves not to play certain strategies through
the use of transfer functions. For example, consider a player 1 who would like to be able
to commit not to playing an action x
1
. Player 1 could simply say that he or she will pay
some large amount, say M (which is higher than the maximum payo to any player in
the matrix) to each other player if player 1 were to play x
1
. In a two person game, player
2 can undo this by simply committing to pay M back to player 1 if player 1 plays x
1
.
However, in a three person game, player 2 would have to pay 2M back to player 1, and
is only getting M from player 1, and so now it is prohibitively costly for player 2 to try
to undo player 1's commitment. This type of commitment possibility makes supporting
desired strategy-payo combinations much easier. The importance of commitment to
strategies dates (at least) to Schelling (1960). In our analysis of three or more player
games, any player can essentially become one who holds a bond (via promised transfers
21
contingent on undesired actions being played) thus committing some other players to
play certain strategies.
Note that if one wishes to introduce a third party to hold a bond in a two player
game, this can be modeled simply by modeling the third party as a third player in the
game who has no actions in the game and no payo other than transfers received (or
made). We discuss this in more detail below.
Let us now turn to the question of supportability. We rst provide a full characteri-
zation. We also oer a very simple set of suÆcient conditions.
Let
u
ms
i
(t) = sup
t
i
"
min
2NE(t
 i
;t
i
)
EU
i
(; t
 i
; t
i
)
#
:
Say that t supports (x; u) if
 x 2 NE(t) and
 U
i
(x; t) = u
i
for all i.
Theorem 9 (x; u) is supportable if and only if there exists a supporting t such that
u
i
 u
ms
i
(t) for each i.
The proof of Theorem 9 is a straightforward variation on the proof of Theorem 7. See
the proof of Theorem 14 in the appendix for details.
The necessary and suÆcient condition in Theorem 9 is more diÆcult to check than
the corresponding condition in Theorem 7, as Theorem 7 shows that with n = 2 one only
needs to check the condition with respect to the uniquely dened minimal supporting t.
That is no longer the case with more than two players. Nevertheless, the conditions for
supportability are a well-dened linear program, and so the condition is still tractable. In
any case, we next provide a much more transparent suÆcient condition for supportability.
The following theorem gives a suÆcient condition for supportability, which illustrates
how permissive support is with three or more players.
Theorem 10 If n  3 and x is a strategy prole and there exists a Nash equilibrium
b
x
such that v
i
(x)  v
i
(
b
x) for all i, then (x; v(x)) is supportable.
Theorem 10 states that strategy prole that oers a Pareto improvement over some
Nash equilibrium payos, is supportable. The proof appears in the appendix. The rough
intuition is that it is possible to use the Nash equilibrium as a threat point to which
players revert if some player does not make the correct supporting oer of transfers in
the rst stage.
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The following example illustrates the power of Theorem 10. It also of interest since it
shows how seemingly small restrictions in the set of admissible transfer functions can be
critical. In particular we show how the analysis of common agency of Prat and Rustichini
(1999) contrasts with what Theorem 9 predicts for a common agency example, and how
this hinges on the set of admissible transfer functions.
Example 11 EÆciency in a Common Agency Example.
Consider a setting with two principals and two agents. The agents are the only players
who take actions. Let us label these as players 1 and 2. The principals are the only ones
whose payos depend on the play of the game.
L R
U 0; 0; 3; 0 0; 0; 0; 2
D 0; 0; 0; 2 0; 0; 2; 0
So in this setting player 1 (an agent) takes an action up or down, while player 2 (also
an agent) takes an action either left or right. The agents' payos are always 0. Player
3 is a principal and would rather that the agents play (U,L) or (D,R), and player 4 is a
principal who would rather that the agents would play (U,R) or (D,L).
Theorem 10 shows that the eÆcient strategy pair (U,L) can be supported together
with payos (0,0,3,0), since this is in fact an equilibrium of the game with no transfers.
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For the above example, Prat and Rustichini's (1999) results conclude that eÆciency
is not an equilibrium outcome and that the principals would play mixed strategies in the
contracts they oer as Prat and Rustichini show in their matching pennies example. The
key dierence is that Prat and Rustichini only consider contracts between principals and
agents, but not between dierent principals or between dierent agents. In the contracts
that support eÆciency in this example and underlie the proof of Theorem 10, there are
transfers made o the equilibrium path between agents and/or principals, as a variety of
transfer functions work.
As a simple, but useful corollary of Theorem 10, note that in any symmetric game
that has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, a symmetric eÆcient strategy prole will be
supportable.
Corollary 12 If n  3 and the game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium with symmet-
ric payos, then any eÆcient strategy that results in symmetric payos is supportable.
This corollary applies to the symmetric public goods game, commons games, and
Cournot games for which such eÆcient outcomes were not supportable when n = 2.
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In fact, Theorem 8 could also be applied and note that all equilibria survive here.
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7 Comparisons of Multiple versus Two Players
As is clear from our results, there are dierences between the consequences of the re-
sults for three or more players and those for two players. Let us oer two important
observations in this regard.
Dummy Players and Bonding
We now show how Theorem 10 is also useful in helping to understand how two players
might use a third player as a bonding agent.
Consider a two person game (X
1
; X
2
; v
1
; v
2
). Let us say that we add a dummy player
if we add a player with a degenerate singleton action space X
3
= fx
3
g and with v
3
(x) = 0
for all x 2 X.
Corollary 13 If in a two person game there exists an eÆcient action pair (x
1
; x
2
) and a
Nash equilibrium (
b
x
1
;
b
x
2
) such that v
i
(x)  v
i
(
b
x) for i 2 f1; 2g, then if a dummy player is
added to the game, x
1
; x
2
; x
3
is supportable together with (u
1
; u
2
; 0) = (v
1
(x); v
2
(x); v
3
(x))
in the three person game.
Note that the use of the third player in the corollary could also be viewed as placing
deposits in escrow to be conditionally returned depending on the actions taken.
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Coalitional Considerations
We have seen results for three or more players show that the strategic aspects of
side contracts are critically dependent on the number of players, and in particular, dier
dramatically depending on whether there are two or more than two players. Part of the
reason for the dierence is that we have not considered coalitional deviations. If instead
of Nash and subgame perfect equilibrium, we considered strong equilibrium and strong
perfect equilibrium, then the reasoning behind the three or more player case would look
more like the two player case. That is, collectively any coalition of n   1 players could
always undo the transfers of any other player and then maximize its payos subject to
only controlling the remaining player through promised transfers. This would result in
benchmarks that are similar to the solo payos for each coalition of n   1 players. In
many contexts, this would again lead to combinations of coalitional payos that exceed
the total eÆcient payo in the game.
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Such a device is discussed by Dutta and Radner (2001) as a means of partly solving a commons
problem associated with investing in technological development related to slowing global warming.
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8 Discussion
We have characterized the outcomes of games that are supportable when players can
commit to making strategy contingent side payments to other players. Some basic con-
clusions from the results can be summarized as follows.
 The incentives to use side payments to aect the strategic aspects of the game are
subtle, and at times conict with eÆciency.
 In some cases, eÆcient strategies that are equilibria in a game without side pay-
ments do not survive when side payments are introduced.
 The solo payos (where only one player can make transfers) are key benchmarks in
understanding what outcomes are supportable in games with side payments.
 With three or more players side payments allow for a sort of commitment to strate-
gies that makes supporting eÆcient strategies (and others) easier to support than
with only two players.
While our results suggest that eÆciency may not always be supportable, we wish to
emphasize an alternative interpretation of the results. The idea that individuals should
be able to make transfers that provide incentives to reach eÆcient points is compelling
on the surface. What we have shown here is that carefully analyzing this simple intuition
leads to deeper problems and hurdles. Individuals will try to manipulate behavior to
their own advantage. This does not preclude the possibility that eÆcient outcomes can
be supported, but it does show that this possibility will be sensitive to the specics
of how individuals can contract before the game. The sorts of simple unilateral oers
for compensations that we have analyzed will not suÆce, and it will be necessary to
have some more complicated forms of bilateral or multilateral contracting with some
commitment that excludes further unilateral contracts (that might undo some aspects of
the multilateral contract).
Let us discuss some of the restrictions on the types of side payments we have consid-
ered and how robust the results should be to changes.
Timing
In our analysis, we have considered only the simultaneous determination of side pay-
ment contracts. Let us argue that this is largely inconsequential. Suppose instead that
players can move sequentially, and perhaps more than once. As long as a player can
respond to the others' contracts, the (modied) solo payos are still relevant. Thus, if
we end at any equilibrium, it must be that each player is still receiving at least their
modied solo payos. This leads to a direct extension of our results.
Thus, in order for timing to really be an issue it must either be that some players
are restricted not to be able to respond to the contracts of others; or else there must be
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some frictions in timing, for instance in the form of time discounting and some time or
eort cost to writing contracts. But note that neither of these situations should improve
eÆciency. In the case where some players are restricted in contracting, the game then
takes on a Stackelberg avor. The specic characterization will change depending on
how contracting is restricted, but much in the same way that Stackelberg competition is
dierent from Cournot competition while still leading to ineÆciency. In the case where
one introduces time or other frictions in contracting, contracting is necessarily costly and
so eÆciency cannot be achieved since it would then require an absence of contracts and
(immediate) play of an eÆcient action prole in the underlying game.
Bilateral Contracting
The contracts we have considered are oered unilaterally | the agents do not ever
come together for bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the side contracting phase. Note
however, that some of the intuition we have developed here already has some important
implications for such a bilateral bargaining setting. After a bilateral contract is signed,
an agent may still have an incentive to make a unilateral oer that eectively undoes
important aspects of contract and pushes things in (ineÆcient) directions that are to
his or her advantage. Completely eliminating this problem could be done by allowing
agents to come together and write a contract that says \no other contracts involving these
parties are possible." Our analysis suggests that such exclusionary contracts would be
helpful in reaching eÆciency, as otherwise agents might make unilateral promises undoing
aspects of bilateral contracts.
Another approach would be to consider signing multilateral contracts that eectively
rewrite the payos in the game (through some transfers) to one that would then be
immune to any further contracting. Our results are helpful in understanding how this
might be done. For instance, in the context of two person games, if through some initial
bilateral contract the payos are rewritten so as to turn the game into a pure coordination
game
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In that case, the solo payos become those from the eÆcient point(s) (which are
now equilibria) and so eÆciency survives. While this is reassuring, one then has to
carefully model the bilateral bargaining phase to try to understand whether this contract
or some other contract would emerge. The answer is not so obvious, especially given
that agents realize that they may still have unilateral oers at their discretion, which
endogenizes the bargaining threat point.
In any case, our results may be thought of as showing that it is critical to consider more
complicated forms of bargaining and contracting in order to support eÆcient outcomes.
This provides a rich agenda for further analysis.
Negative Transfers
26
A simple recipe for this is to split the total payo from every prole of actions evenly, or according
to some xed weights.
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Another important aspect of our analysis is that players can only promise positive
payments to other players, and cannot make threats of violence (perhaps at a cost to all
players) or steal from or tax other players.
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Our results that eÆciency is not always
supportable with reward based contracts suggests that threats might be useful in reaching
eÆciency in some cases, which might partly explain their use.
Let us make an important observation about the robustness of positive transfers versus
negative ones. The type of positive transfer contracts that we have considered here are
immune to renegotiation ex post (after the second stage game has been played). After
the action has been played, since these contracts only involve transfers from one player to
others, there are no other transfers that all players would like to renegotiate to, ex post.
Violence (and even stealing) will generally be costly for the player inicting the negative
transfer, and so ex post it may be that all players can benet from a renegotiation. So, in
short, allowing for threats of violence, stealing, punishments, etc. contingent on actions
might be a useful additional tool for supporting eÆcient outcomes, but further study is
needed and this will involve some attention to ex post renegotiation that was not needed
in the analysis here.
Contracts on Contracts
There are two other aspects of the contracting that deserve further attention.
First, the contracts that we have considered are not contingent on the contracts oered
by other players. Allowing for such contingencies presents substantial technical hurdles
in modeling, as when each contract is contingent upon the form of the other it results
in a self-referential problem. This was rst pointed out in the competing mechanisms
literature (see McAfee (1993), Peck (1995), and Epstein and Peters (1999)). Considering
the impact of such contingent contracts is an important open and diÆcult problem in
many contexts. As one can see from Epstein and Peters (1999), it has been a challenge
even to prove that problems involving such contingencies are well-posed! A reasonable
conjecture (based in part on the understanding of modeling that comes from Epstein and
Peters (1999)) is that we might consider contracting on a game with an augmented action
space (some M  X, where M is derived endogenously and incorporates some aspects
of the contracting but is payo irrelevant in the second-stage game). In that case, the
basic results we have here would still go through, as the solo payos would be unchanged.
While this seems to be a reasonable conjecture, it appears to be diÆcult to prove.
The second issue related to contracts on contracts is viewing additional contracting
stages before the larger game we have examined here. That is, one might also think of the
two stage process that we have considered here as a game, and then consider contracting
before it. Of course, one can then build this up arbitrarily.
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One possibility is to look
for some level at which no further contracting would matter. Again, this provides an
agenda for future research.
27
See Schelling (1960) for some interesting discussion of the role of such threats.
28
See Laguno (1992) for such an approach in the context of selecting mechanisms.
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Looking to Mechanism Design and Implementation
We close by noting that our results also have important implications for the mecha-
nism design and implementation literatures. Our results on the survivability of equilibria
show that if the mechanism designer cannot control the side contracting of agents, then
even if the mechanism is implementing eÆcient outcomes (when no side contracting
is considered), the agents will have incentives to alter the workings of the mechanism
through side contracts. Understanding the implementation problem in this broader con-
text could provide very dierent conditions for implementability. It also raises questions
such as which sorts of mechanisms are least susceptible to being undone by side payments.
As such side contracting is available (and observed) in many situations, our results here
suggest that this is an essential next step in the mechanism design and implementation
literatures.
28
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: Asking whether x survives is equivalent to asking whether
(x; v(x)) is supportable (where v(x) is the vector with i-th entry v
i
(x)). Since x is a
Nash equilibrium of the second-stage game, it follows from the denition of t
x;u
that
t
x;v(x)
= t
0
. This implies that u
ms
(x; v(x)) = u
s
, and then Theorem 1 follows from
Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 5: We show that
u
ms
i
(x; u)  u
s
i
(1)
for any i and x; u. Given (1), the theorem then follows from Theorem 7.
So let us now show (1). Consider any t
i
. Let
b
t
i
= t
i
+ t
x;u
ji
. It follows that
t
ij
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0
)  t
0
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0
) =
b
t
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0
)  t
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ji
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0
)
for every x
0
. This implies that the net transfers across players are identical under (t
0
 i
; t
i
)
and (t
x;u
 i
;
b
t
i
) and so NE(t
0
 i
; t
i
) = NE(t
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 i
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b
t
i
). Thus, for each t
i
there exists
b
t
i
such that
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i
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Since this is true for any t
i
, it follows that
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2
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#
;
which establishes (1).
Proof of Theorem 7: Let us rst show that if (x; u) is supportable, then u
i
 u
ms
i
(x; u)
for each i.
Suppose to the contrary that u
i
< u
ms
i
(x; u) for some i and (x; u) is supportable. It
follows that there exists some t
i
such that
u
i
< min
2NE(t
x;u
 i
;t
i
)
EU
i
(; t
x;u
 i
; t
i
): (2)
Let t be any set of transfers for which (x; u) is supported. Note that, as argued in the
text, it must be that t
j
 t
x;u
j
. Let
b
t
i
= t
i
+ t
ji
  t
x;u
ji
. It follows that
t
ij
(x
0
)  t
x;u
ji
(x
0
) =
b
t
ij
(x
0
)  t
ji
(x
0
)
for every x
0
. This implies that the net transfers across players are identical under (t
 i
;
b
t
i
)
and (t
x;u
 i
; t
i
) and so NE(t
 i
;
b
t
i
) = NE(t
x;u
 i
; t
i
). Thus, from (2) it follows that
u
i
< min
2NE(t
 i
;
b
t
i
)
EU
i
(; t
x;u
 i
;
b
t
i
):
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Let i deviate from t and announce
b
t
i
in the rst stage. It follows from the inequality
above that the worst possible continuation payo in the subgame that follows is better
than the expected continuation under t. This contradicts the fact that t was played in
the rst stage of an equilibrium that supports (x; u).
Next, let us show that if u
i
 u
ms
i
(x; u) for each i, then (x; u) is supportable, and by
t
x;u
.
Let us specify equilibrium strategies. In the rst stage t
x;u
is played and x is played in
the second stage. A full specication of the equilibrium strategies includes specication of
what happens o the equilibrium path as follows. If in the rst stage player i plays t
x;u
i
and
player j plays t
j
6= t
x;u
j
, then in the second stage that follows the play is  2 NE(t
x;u
i
; t
j
)
that minimizes EU
j
(; t
x;u
i
; t
j
) over  2 NE(t
x;u
i
; t
j
). In a subgame following play of t
such that t
i
6= t
x;u
i
and t
j
6= t
x;u
j
, select any  2 NE(t). To see that this forms a subgame
perfect equilibrium, note that by the denition of t
x;u
it follows that if t
x;u
is played in
the rst stage, then it is an equilibrium to play x in the second stage. So we need only
show that there is no deviation away from t
x;u
to t
j
6= t
x;u
j
by some j. It follows from the
denition of u
ms
(x; u) and our specication of o the equilibrium path behavior that if
any player j deviates from announcing t
x;u
j
in the rst stage then player j's payo will be
no more than u
ms
j
(x; u). Since u
j
 u
ms
j
(x; u), it follows that this cannot be an improving
deviation.
Proof of Theorem 8: Let M = 1 +max
i;x
0
;x
00
[v
i
(x
0
)  v
i
(x
00
)]. Fix a Nash equilibrium
x of the underlying game. Consider the transfer functions
t
ij
(
e
x) =

2M if
e
x
i
6= x
i
0 otherwise.
Under the above transfer functions it is a strictly dominant strategy for each player i
to play x
i
, and so x is a unique Nash equilibrium in the second-period game. Specify
this behavior on the equilibrium path, and o the equilibrium path choose any Nash
equilibrium in the second stage. We need only consider that a deviation to some
b
t
i
by a
player i is not protable for i. Such a deviation can only be improving if it leads to play
of something other than x
 i
by other players. (If only i changed actions, then i cannot
do better given that x was a Nash equilibrium and t
ji
(
b
x) = 0 when
b
x
j
= x
j
.) First,
consider the case where a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
b
x is played in the second stage
where
b
x
j
6= x
j
for some j 6= i. Let there be k  1 players j 6= i such that
b
x
j
6= x
i
, and
consider some such j. By playing
b
x player j's payo is
v
j
(
b
x)  (n  1)2M + 2Mk +
b
t
ij
(
b
x):
If j plays x
j
instead, then j's payo is
v
j
(
b
x
 j
; x
j
) + 2Mk +
b
t
ij
(
b
x
 j
; x
j
):
For
b
x
j
to be a Nash equilibrium conditional on
b
t, this implies that
b
t
ij
(
b
x) 
b
t
ij
(
b
x
 j
; x
j
)  v
j
(
b
x
 j
; x
j
)  v
j
(
b
x) + (n  1)2M:
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Given our denition of M and the fact that n  1  2, it follows that
b
t
ij
(
b
x) 
b
t
ij
(
b
x
 j
; x
j
) > 3M:
This implies that
b
t
ij
(
b
x) > 3M . This is true for any j with
b
x
j
6= x
j
. So, player i's utility
in the new equilibrium is at most
v
i
(
b
x)  k3M + k2M:
For k  1, the denition of M implies that this expression is less than v
i
(x). Thus, the
deviation cannot be improving. The above reasoning is extends to the case of mixed
strategy equilibria in the second stage by similar arguments applied to each realization
in the support of the mixed strategy.
Proof of Theorem 10: Consider x and a Nash equilibrium
b
x such that v
i
(x)  v
i
(
b
x)
for each i.
Set t as follows.
t
ij
(
e
x) =
8
<
:
2M if
e
x
 i
= x
 i
and
e
x
i
6= x
i
2M if
e
x
 i
6= x
 i
and
e
x
i
6=
b
x
i
0 otherwise.
It is easy to verify that x 2 NE(t), as if i deviates then i pays M to each other player.
To support (x; v(x)) have the strategies of the players be to play t in the rst stage and
x in the second stage. Specify o the equilibrium path strategies as follows. Conditional
on a single player i deviating from t to some
b
t
i
in the rst stage, then play
b
x in the
second period if
b
x 2 NE(t
 i
;
b
t
i
) and otherwise play the worst Nash equilibrium for i out
of NE(t
 i
;
b
t
i
). Conditional on more than one player deviating from t in the rst stage,
play any Nash equilibrium in the resulting subgame.
To complete the proof of the theorem, we need only check that that no player i
can benet by deviating to some
b
t
i
in the rst period. If
b
x 2 NE(t
 i
;
b
t
i
), then the
resulting play will be
b
x and so t
ji
(
b
x) = 0 for all j 6= i. Thus, the payo to i will be
v
i
(
b
x)  
P
j 6=i
b
t
ij
(
b
x). Since this is less than v
i
(
b
x), it is less than v
i
(x) and cannot be a
benecial deviation. Thus, consider the case where
b
x =2 NE(t
 i
;
b
t
i
) but there is some
pure strategy
e
x 2 NE(t
 i
;
b
t
i
). If
e
x = x then it cannot be a benecial deviation since
v
i
(x)  v
i
(x) 
P
j 6=i
b
t
ij
(x).
We are left with the case where
e
x 6= x and
e
x 6=
b
x. Let us rst show that it must be
that
e
x
k
6= x
k
for at least two players k and j, with the possibility that k = i. To see
this, suppose to the contrary that
e
x
k
6= x
k
for just one k. Given the denition of t
j
for
each j 6= i, it must be that i is paying at least (2n   3)M to each j =2 fi; kg for whom
e
x
j
6=
b
x
j
as otherwise j would rather play
b
x
j
. The transfers to i from each such j amount
to at most M and are 0 from any other j. i also gets at most M from k. Thus, by the
denition of M , this cannot be a benecial deviation for i unless x
 i;k
=
b
x
 i;k
. If k = i,
then it must be that x
 i
=
b
x
 i
and t
j
(
e
x) = 0 for all j 6= i. Since
b
x
i
is a best response to
34
bx
 i
it follows that v
i
(
b
x)  v
i
(
e
x), and so v
i
(
b
x)  v
i
(
e
x)  
P
j 6=i
b
t
ij
(
e
x), which implies that
this could not be a protable deviation. Therefore, the only such k must be some k 6= i,
and thus
e
x
 k
= x
 k
. Thus, by the structure t
k
for this to be a best response i must pay k
at least (2n  3)M and gets M from k and 0 from other j's (for whom
e
x
j
=
b
x
j
as shown
above). This cannot be protable for i.
Thus we know that
e
x
k
6= x
k
for at least two distinct players, with the possibility that
k = i. This means that
e
x
 j
6= x
 j
for each j 6= i and so by the argument above we know
that
e
x
j
=
b
x
j
for each j 6= i in order for this to be a protable deviation for i. This means
that t
j
(
e
x) = 0 for each j 6= i. However, then since
b
x
i
is a best response to
b
x
 i
it follows
that v
i
(
b
x)  v
i
(
e
x), and so v
i
(
b
x)  v
i
(
e
x)  
P
j 6=i
b
t
ij
(
e
x), which implies that this could not
be a protable deviation.
The extension to the case where in place of
e
x there is a mixed strategy equilibrium
is a straightforward extension of the above reasoning, working on the payments that are
made in each realization of the support of the Nash equilibrium.
Games with Continuum Actions
The major technical hurdle faced when the second-period game has innite (pure)
strategy spaces is nding the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in the two
stage game. If discontinuous transfer functions are allowed (even o the equilibrium
path!) then there will be some subsequent subgames where no equilibrium exists. This
presents a diÆculty, as even restricting attention to continuous transfer functions is then
a problem, as it will not be a closed space. One must limit attention to some compact
and convex set of transfer functions, for which there always exist second stage equilibria.
With this approach, we describe here how the characterization theorems presented above
hold in the continuum case.
Consider a game where X
i
is a compact metric space and let 
i
(X
i
) denote the Borel
measures on X
i
. Let v
i
be continuous on X for each i. Consider the set of continuous
transfer functions T = 
i
T
i
.
29
Thus, NE(t) is nonempty and compact for each t.
30
As in the nite case, dene
u
ms
i
(t) = sup
t
i
2T
i
"
min
2NE(t
 i
;t
i
)
EU
i
(; t
 i
; t
i
)
#
:
Note that min
2NE(t
 i
;t
i
)
EU
i
(; t
 i
; t
i
) is well-dened since EU
i
(; t
 i
; t
i
) is continuous
and linear in , and NE(t
 i
; t
i
) is nonempty and compact.
29
One could use a more general space. Any space T for which NE(t) is nonempty and closed (it is then
necessarily compact given the space of mixed strategies) will work. In that case one may need to replace
min
2NE(t)
EU
i
(; t) in the denition of u
ms
i
with inf , and make some corresponding adjustments in
the proof of Theorem 14.
30
In that case, U
i
(x; t) is continuous in x for each i, and then EU
i
(; t) is continuous and quasi-concave
(in fact linear) in . Then by a theorem of Debreu, Fan, and Glicksberg (e.g., see Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991)) there exists a Nash equilibrium of the game with t xed. Closure of the set of Nash equilibria
(using weak convergence) then follows easily from the continuity of U
i
(x; t) in x.
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Say that t 2 T supports (x; u) if
 x 2 NE(t) and
 U
i
(x; t) = u
i
for all i.
We nd the following theorem that covers any n.
Theorem 14 (x; u) is supportable if and only if there exists a supporting t 2 T such
that u
i
 u
ms
i
(t) for each i.
Proof of Theorem 14: Let us rst show that if (x; u) is part of a subgame perfect
equilibrium with supporting t, then u
i
 u
ms
i
(t) for each i.
Suppose to the contrary that u
i
< u
ms
i
(t) for some i. It follows that there exists some
t
i
such that
u
i
< min
2NE(t
 i
;t
i
)
EU
i
(; t
 i
; t
i
): (3)
If player i deviates to play t
i
, then for any  that follows in the subgame, i will benet.
This contradicts the fact that (x; u) is supported by t.
Next, let us show that if u
i
 u
ms
i
(t) for each i, then (x; u) is supportable.
Let us specify equilibrium strategies. In the rst stage t is played and x is played in
the second stage. If in the rst stage some player i plays t
i
6= t
i
, then in the subgame
that follows the play is  2 NE(t
 i
; t
i
) that minimizes EU
i
(; t
 i
; t
i
). In any other
subgame select any . To see that this forms a subgame perfect equilibrium, note that
by the support of (x; u) by t it follows that if t is played in the rst stage, then it is
an equilibrium to play x in the second stage. So we need only show that there is no
deviation away from t to t
i
6= t
i
by some i. It follows from the denition of u
ms
(t) and
our specication of o the equilibrium path behavior that if any player i deviates from
announcing t
i
in the rst stage, then player i's payo will be no more than u
ms
i
(t). Since
u
i
 u
ms
j
(t), it follows that this cannot be an improving deviation.
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